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LECTURES
I-COMMERCE: TOCQUEVILLE, THE
INTERNET, AND THE LEGALIZED SELF
Jeffrey Rosen*
I want to begin by identifying a social problem, and then think
together with you about potential solutions. The problem is easy to
state, for it was Alexis de Tocqueville's problem: In democracy,
people refuse to defer to any authority except for public opinion. And
the beginning of the twenty-first century, the age of the Internet and
reality TV, is an age where the logic of democracy is infiltrating more
and more aspects of our personal and professional lives. As a teacher,
I have an incentive to be popular and entertaining, rather than
arrogant and condescending, so that my students will give me good
teaching evaluations. As an author, I can watch my Amazon.com
ratings rise and fall several times a day. As a seller on eBay.com, my
reputation points for trustworthiness will soar or plummet based on
how reliably I deliver the goods.
A democratic society in which a person's status goes up and down
based on popular approval is one in which there is not a lot of social
consensus about how individuals should behave. In traditional
hierarchical societies, behavior can be regulated by a sense of shame
and honor rather than law. In fifteenth-century Spain, for example, a
woman who cohabited with a man less than a year after her
widowhood was considered "infamous" and dead to respectable
society.' By contrast, in a pluralistic democracy, the only behavior
that everyone agrees is shameful is acting as if you think you are
better than everyone else. In aristocracies, Tocqueville wrote,
"[g]enuine dignity of manners consists in always showing oneself in
one's place, neither higher nor lower."2 By contrast, in democracies
* Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School. A.B.
Harvard; B.A. Oxford; J.D. Yale. This essay was originally presented as the Philip D.
Reed Lecture at Fordham University School of Law on February 7, 2001. A version
of the lecture was also published in the Drake Law Review, 49 Drake L Rev. 427
(2001).
1. See Lucy A. Sponsler, The Status of Married Women Under the Legal System
of Spain, 42 La. L. Rev. 1599, 1602-04 (1982) (discussing restrictions placed on women
and marriage in Spain).
2. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 579 (Harvey C. Mansfield &
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"a certain incoherence in manners always reigns because they
conform to the sentiments and individual ideas of each rather than to
an ideal model given in advance for imitation by all."3
This leads, as Tocqueville recognized, to the problem of the
legalized self. As respect for traditional forms of authority erodes,
Americans turn increasingly to law and the courts to regulate the kind
of behavior that used to be governed by manners and mores. In
schools, in workplaces, in churches, and in politics, our interactions
are increasingly conducted in the shadow of legalese. But when the
courts take sides in vigorous social and political disputes, they find
their own authority just as undermined as all the other mistrusted
institutions in our mistrustful culture. The self-immolation of the
Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore4 is only the latest example. So, what
happens when we no longer respect the courts?
That is the problem: Law is like an antibiotic-when we use the
courts too much, they lose some of their power to stigmatize, shame,
and usefully restrain behavior because they get no more deference
than anyone else. A hundred years ago, a felony conviction would
lead to social infamy. Today, pardoned tax fugitives are welcome at
New York dinner parties. We have been saturated with laws and
legalisms, and are now eager for more effective, non-legal alternatives
for regulating behavior.
In a recent article in the New York Times Magazine, I explored this
problem of the legalized self, and I will briefly summarize the
argument here. But I want to devote most of our time together to
exploring with you alternatives to the problem. In particular, I will
argue that the Internet may provide an encouraging alternative: a
model for the resurrection of democratic manners-a mechanism for
the application of democratic shame.
Consider, on this score, the recent international Web drama
concerning Brad the Cad, the twenty-seven-year-old British lawyer
who received an e-mail message at work from his girlfriend, Claire, a
twenty-six-year-old P.R. executive for MagicButton.net.6 In the
message, Claire expressed her appreciation for an intimate encounter
they had shared the other evening. Brad proceeded to forward the
message to six male friends, boasting, "Now THAT'S a nice
compliment from a lass, isn't it?" Within a week, the message had
Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835-40).
3. Id.
4. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5. Jeffrey Rosen, In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2001, § 6 (Magazine),
at 46.
6. See, e.g., David Hudson, Now 40 Staff Face Axe Over Saucy E-Mail, Sunday
Express, Dec. 17, 2000, at 39, LEXIS, News Library, SUNEX File; Sarah Lyall,
Return to Sender, Please, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2000, § 4, at 2, LEXIS, News Library,
NYT File; T.R. Reid, Thanks for Last Night! (cc. The Entire World), Wash. Post, Dec.
18, 2000, at C1, LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File.
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circled the globe, and the Web site at Brad's firm crashed after
receiving 70,000 hits in a single day. Claire and Brad fled their homes
to escape from the tabloid press, and a Web site was set up for others
to debate what should become of Brad.
But very quickly a debate that began by focusing on manners and
morals devolved into one about legalisms and law. The Brad and
Claire Web site took a poll about whether or not Brad should be fired
from his law firm, Norton Rose. The largest percentage of
respondents-thirty-nine percent-said he should be fired because he
had abused company resources. A smaller percentage - twenty-six
percent-said he should be fired for abusing Claire's trust. No one
took the position that would have seemed obvious 100 years ago:
Brad should be shunned socially for being a braggart, but his boasting
wasn't his employer's business.
Norton Rose, for its part, cranked up a formal disciplinary
procedure, grilling Brad and his colleagues in an exhaustive hearing.
Finally, the law firm posted a statement about "e-mail abuse" on its
own Web site, saying that it was "concerned about a clear breach" of
company rules and that Brad and the others had been "disciplined but
not dismissed." The moral debate about whether Brad should be
punished for his caddish behavior was transformed into a legalistic
debate about workplace rules.
The drama of Brad the Cad reflects a social transformation: The
vocabulary of law and legalisms is the only shared language we have
left for regulating behavior in an era in which there is no longer a
social consensus about how men and women, or even boys and girls,
should behave. But rather than leading to more understanding and
empathy, the legalization of our personal and professional lives is
leading to more social polarization and more mistrust of authority in
all its forms.
This phenomenon has vindicated the prediction of Tocqueville, who
argued that as citizens became more equal in American democracy,
public opinion would be the only source of authority.' He wrote: "As
citizens become more equal and alike, the penchant of each to believe
blindly a certain man or class diminishes. The disposition to believe
the mass is augmented, and more and more it is opinion that leads the
world."' According to Tocqueville, the rule of public opinion-which
holds that no one should be treated better than anyone else-would
lead Americans to consider all other forms of authority "with the eye
of a malcontent." 9  As traditional sources of authority were
undermined by democracy, legislators would pass an increasingly
mind-numbing web of laws and regulations designed to eradicate
7. See Tocqueville, supra note 2, at 409.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 639.
20011
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special privileges and prevent those in power from favoring some
citizens over others. Tocqueville warned that these laws would run
the risk of creating a despotism of a different sort, administered by
lawyers and politicians who would act not like "tyrants, but rather
schoolmasters."'" Looking far into the future, Tocqueville feared that
as individuals increasingly turned to the nanny state to regulate the
most minute aspects of social life, personal interactions might be
governed by "a network of small, complicated, painstaking, uniform
rules."" These rules might be so arcane, he feared, that citizens would
eventually stop trying to understand or resist them, and increasingly
large aspects of social and political life would be overseen by the
American lawyer, "the lone interpreter of an occult science," who
would resemble an Egyptian priest." And the "immense tutelary
power... [,] absolute, detailed, regular, far-seeing, and mild," would
extend its arms over society as a whole.13 "[I]t does not tyrannize, it
hinders, compromises, enervates, extinguishes, dazes, and finally
reduces each nation to being nothing more than a herd of timid and
industrious animals of which government is the shepherd."' 4
When Tocqueville came to America in 1831, American society was
still vertical enough to have clearly identifiable social hierarchies.
And in an age when citizens had no doubt about where they stood in
the ruthless pecking order, interactions among different classes of
people were regulated by a sense of honor and shame. The idea that
gentlemen should behave honorably, for example, was an idea that
high-status people traditionally used to differentiate themselves from
low-status people. In a traditional honor-based society, like the Old
South, if you were insulted by a social equal, you challenged him to a
duel, and if you were insulted by a social inferior, you bludgeoned him
with a cane. But under no circumstances would a gentleman sue
another gentleman, because the honor code held that an offense
against honor could only be answered by a physical attack. 15
In twentieth-century America, thankfully, identity became far more
open and fluid. Like Jay Gatsby, you could choose who you wanted
to be rather than being defined by your social status at birth. And as
American society became less hierarchical, the code of honor came to
be seen as oppressive and patriarchal-a way of keeping women and
minorities in their places.
But these changes had unintended consequences. The social critic
Christopher Lasch has noted that, as traditional hierarchies in
10. Id. at 662.
11. Id. at 663.
12. Id. at 255.
13. Id. at 663.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 597-98 (stating that nobles in the Middle Ages "were required to
make use of the lance and the sword" to settle disputes).
[Vol. 70
INTERNETAND THE LEGALIZED SELF
families, schools, and workplaces collapsed in the 1960s, the authority
of parents and bosses was replaced by a panoply of experts-guidance
counselors, psychiatrists, therapists, and judges-who imposed social
control in more therapeutic but no less confining ways. " And at the
same time, laws began to fill the social space previously occupied by
manners and mores. The rights revolution of the 1960s had many
noble achievements, but, in rebelling against hierarchical authority in
all of its forms, it arguably threw out the baby with the bath water. In
the late 1960s, as the authority of teachers and parents came under
siege, school discipline began to be legalized as well. The rights
revolution gave way to what Lawrence M. Friedman, the Stanford
legal historian, has called a general expectation of "total justice"--the
idea that courts could compensate individuals for every misfortune,
social slight, or general brush with unfairness or bad luck." This trend
accelerated in the 1980s and '90s as the democratizing effects of the
Internet made vast amounts of information available online, and
ordinary citizens found it easier to challenge the authority of
traditional intermediaries, like lawyers, doctors, and teachers. A
result was an explosion of legalisms. Vast areas of life that used to be
regulated by a complicated array of formal and informal social
conventions-from school discipline to abortion, gay rights, and
sexual harassment-became regulated instead by rules and laws."
The explosion of legalisms has become so pervasive that it is
transforming even the last bastions of traditional authority. Shunning
and shaming were the traditional ways that hierarchical societies
enforced standards of behavior before personal interactions became
legalized. Some religions still have a practice of "shunning," which
requires members of the church to avoid all social contact with people
who have been expelled from the church for breaking the church's
moral code. Although these rituals may seem archaic to outsiders,
they are central to the church's ability to practice its religion without
interference from the state. In the past few years, however, some
parishioners who have been shunned for immoral behavior have
responded with lawsuits.
In a curious case from the 1980s, a woman from a small town in
Oklahoma sued the Church of Christ after it expelled her for having
sexual relations outside of marriage with a local resident who was not
a member of the congregation." The Church had followed the
disciplinary procedure set forth in Matthew 18:13-17: The elders
confronted the woman three times, and, after she refused to repent of
her fornication, they formally announced her transgressions to the
16. See generally, Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in
an Age of Diminishing Expectations (1979).
17. Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice 5 (2d ed. 1994).
18. Rosen, supra note 5, at 49.
19. Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville. 775 P.2d 766, 767-68 (Okla. 1989).
20011
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
entire congregation, which then refused to acknowledge her
presence.20 The woman sued the Church, claiming that the shunning
ritual violated her privacy and caused her emotional distress. 2' A jury
awarded her $435,000, and, in an outlandish opinion, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma upheld the claim that the Church could be sued
for shunning conduct that occurred after the woman resigned from the
Church.' Once the woman resigned during the expulsion procedure,
the court held she was no longer a member of the Church, and
therefore the Church had no right to discipline her.23 In the wake of
this opinion, lawyers are advising churches to dismantle their
traditional shaming rituals and offer wayward parishioners arbitration
agreements instead.
Decisions like this point to the paradox of our increasingly
democratic age. As traditional authorities find themselves under
siege, citizens increasingly turn to laws and legalisms to resolve their
social and political disputes. But when courts actually take sides in
those disputes, they find their own legitimacy challenged by the losers,
who disagree too violently with the rulings to accept them with good
grace. As a result, the one branch of government that society trusts to
exercise its authority-the judiciary-loses its authority the more that
it tries to assert itself.
The paradox of the legalized self is something that Tocqueville did
not entirely anticipate when he wrote about ways of forestalling the
mild despotism to which democracy is prone.24  In particular,
Tocqueville identified a series of intermediate institutions that could
bring individuals out of their self-regarding shells and induce them to
form productive social relationships without relying on the stultifying
beneficence of the nanny state.2 He singled out judges and juries,
local self-government, and intermediate associations such as
temperance societies and other civic groups.26 Tocqueville also
stressed the importance of shame and manners, as opposed to law, in
regulating behavior, as embodied in respect for forms and formalities,
the moderating power of religion, and above all, the virtue of
women.
27
Each of these institutions has been eroded, however, by the same
relentless egalitarianism and mistrust of authority to which
Tocqueville hoped they might serve as an antidote. The jury has been
transformed from an inscrutable and mystical authority whose
20. Id. at 768-69.
21. Id. at 769.
22. Id. at 769, 784-85.
23. Id.
24. See Tocqueville, supra note 2, at 485-88.
25. Id. at 489.
26. See id. at 496-500.
27. See id. at 535-78.
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verdicts are accepted on faith, to a multicultural and representative
body that is expected to reflect the racial and sexual fissures in society.
This means that jury verdicts are just as hotly contested as the
decisions of every other branch of democratic government. The
authority of judges has suffered for the reasons I have just described,
as courts have interjected themselves increasingly into social disputes
about which people vigorously disagree. The virtues of local self-
government have been undermined by the Supreme Court's decisions
in recent years applying equal protection norms to our decentralized
electoral system, and calling into question local control over the
structure and design of state and federal elections. (In this sense,
Bush v. Gore28 is a ludicrous expansion of cases like Shaw v. Reno,-
which have plunged judges into the political thicket.) The decline of
voluntary associations has been exhaustively chronicled by social
critics such as Robert Putnam in Bowling Alone." Finally, there is the
decline of the two moral forces that Tocqueville identified as bulwarks
against the vices of democracy-traditional religions and the virtue of
women.3' But why don't we leave those for another lecture.
In fact, as I began by noting, shame and honor have lost much of
their constraining force because citizens in a pluralistic democracy no
longer agree about what sort of behavior should be considered
shameful or dishonorable-the social hierarchies that can support
clear conceptions of honor and shame have, thankfully, collapsed.-
But that doesn't mean that notions of shame, honor, and social
cooperation can't be resurrected in the twenty-first century; they just
have to be cultivated in democratic rather than hierarchical ways.
And in this regard, the Internet provides a model for a world where
behavior can be regulated by shame, rather than law. But the shame I
have in mind is democratic shame-not the hierarchically imposed
shunning rituals of the Church of Christ, but ranking systems in virtual
communities where an individual's status rises or falls based on the
collective opinion of others."-
This part of my argument is tentative, so let me present it, and then
we can discuss whether or not you find any of it persuasive. Recall
Tocqueville's arguments about the value of participation in
intermediate associations, from private contractual agreements to
interest groups and political organizations.' Rather than retreating
into atomized individualism, or surrendering control over their lives to
the nanny state, Tocqueville argued that individuals who participated
28. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
29. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
30. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American
Community (2000).
31. See Tocqueville, supra note 2, at 264-302.
32. See id. at 589-99.
33. See id
34. Id at 496-500.
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in intermediate organizations could cooperate in ways consistent with
their particular interests and abilities." He wrote, "Local freedoms,
which make many citizens put value on the affection of their
neighbors and those close to them, therefore constantly bring men
closer to one another, despite the instincts that separate them, and
force them to aid each other. ' 36
The challenge, according to Tocqueville, was to rouse citizens out of
their individualistic stupor and to find ways of inducing them to
cooperate.37 "In democratic peoples... all citizens are independent
and weak; they can do almost nothing by themselves, and none of
them can oblige those like themselves to lend them their cooperation.
They therefore all fall into impotence if they do not learn to aid each
other freely. '38  But the Internet, in many ways, helps to solve
Tocqueville's problem of social coordination. It allows the formation
of voluntary associations that are not possible in real space, by
bringing together people of similar interests in ways that avoid the
constraints of time and geographic space. The Internet combines the
community-building qualities of a newspaper-which Tocqueville
considered indispensable to the formation of associations39-with the
interactivity of a town meeting. And it allows for the cultivation of
democratic shame.
We can all think of examples where the Internet creates a sense of
cooperation and mutual responsibility, from online medical support
groups to communities of collectors who meet at conventions and
exchange artifacts online. There is also extensive evidence that the
Internet is a supplement to real-space interactions rather than a
substitute for it. The initial studies suggesting that people were
lonelier as they spent more time online interacting with strangers and
less time at home with their families and friends were too simplistic.
Follow-up studies suggested that the Internet is a very flexible
medium and that it acts as an amplifier for pre-existing personality
traits: If you are outgoing, the Internet will help you extend your
social networks; if you are an introvert, it will provide new
opportunities for retreating into yourself.40
Interactions in cyberspace are more egalitarian and democratic than
those in real space because they mask the aspects of identity that can
35. Id. at 487.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 490.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 493-94.
40. See Lisa Guernsey, Cyberspace Isn't So Lonely After All, N.Y. Times, July 26.
2001, at G1 (quoting Robert Kraut of Carnegie Mellon University as stating that
"[eixtroverts, who like making new friends, are using new technology to express that,"
but "[w]hen introverts are using the Internet... it seems to hurt their social well-
being, their social connectedness").
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lead to social disagreement in real space." "On the Internet," as the
famous New Yorker cartoon notes, "nobody knows you're a dog,"4 2
and no one knows your race, gender, or religion either. 3 Because
non-verbal cues about identity-including not only immutable
characteristics, but also facial expressions, gestures, eye contact, and
so forth-are absent on the Internet, discussions there tend to be less
hierarchical and less distorted by difference in status. "Women, for
example, are less likely to be interrupted in cyberspace discussions. '
Robert Putnam is agonistic about whether the "flow of information
itself fosters social capital and genuine community,"45 because he
worries that "[t]he poverty of social cues in computer-mediated
communication inhibits interpersonal collaboration and trust,
especially when the interaction is anonymous and not nested in a
wider social context.'146
On this point, I am more optimistic. Precisely because the
interactive self in cyberspace is thinner than in real space, productive
associations may be easier to sustain. A new field of reputation
management is studying the ways that democratic reputation systems
in cyberspace can build trust, even among strangers whose identities
are virtually anonymous. User ratings are becoming a central feature
of the Web. Amazon famously allows readers to be critics, and also
allows them to rate the reviews of other readers. Along the same
lines, Epinions.com assembles product reviews from its users and
gives "trust" points to especially respected contributors. The auction
site eBay has a rating system that allows buyers and sellers to evaluate
each other's trustworthiness after each transaction, and to earn
"reputation points" that are affixed to each user's screen name, which
may be a pseudonym. No matter how positive or negative a review, it
can only affect a seller's reputation by one point.
On sites like eBay, of course, people can escape bad reputations by
changing their names, in the same way that people who behaved
shamefully in nineteenth-century novels could flee to another town
and reinvent themselves. But Paul Resnick of the University of
Michigan has found that there are economic benefits to having a good
reputation on eBay: Some sellers will accept lower bids from buyers
with good reputations, rather than choosing a higher bidder with a
worse reputation and risking that he or she vill not ultimately
deliver.47 Because a positive reputation, unlike a negative reputation,
41. See Putnam, supra note 30, at 172.
42. Peter Steiner, Cartoon, The New Yorker, July 5. 1993, available at
http://www.cartoonbank.com.
43. See Putnam, supra note 30, at 172.
44. Id. at 173.
45. Id. at 172.
46. Id. at 176.
47. Telephone Interview with Paul Resnick, Professor, University of Michigan
(Oct. 2000) (on file with Fordhamn Law Review).
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tends to follow me throughout my eBay interactions, I have an
incentive to cultivate and sustain a positive reputation-and to behave
well as a result.
Resnick's insight is that manners can regulate behavior more
effectively than law in a space where people have an incentive to be
trustworthy because those who are not skilled or ethical enough to be
trustworthy will not succeed in the marketplace. "You'll be found out
right away, so it's not worth it," he says.48 "So rewards for good
behavior are more effective than punishment for bad."49
Fear of shame, in other words, can regulate behavior on the
Internet precisely because a good reputation has tangible benefits in a
space where your reputation can trail you for a long time. But rather
than relying on hierarchical conceptions of shame that are tied to
notions of group status and identity, the Internet allows for the
operation of a kind of democratic shame, as strangers who have never
met rate each other based on the actual quality of their individualized
interactions. Those who behave well in virtual interactions are
rewarded. Those who do not are not. There is no need for pre-
existing agreement about manners and mores in an open community,
because the manners and mores are defined by the social interactions
themselves.
The eBay example confirms Tocqueville's hope that the honor to be
found in hardy commercial ventures might provide an antidote to
individualism and the schoolmaster state. Private contracts teach
individuals to tend to their own interests in relationships of mutual
dependence, rather than passively relying on the state to look out for
them. E-commerce does not create individuals who are genuinely
attached to each other, as lords and their vassals might have been, but
it allows individuals to respect each other as business partners, equally
capable of exercising reason and free will. By abstracting away the
extraneous aspects of identity that can divide individuals in a
pluralistic society, the Internet makes sturdy economic affiliations
possible and allows fear of shame-that is, of getting a bad
reputation-to constrain behavior more effectively than law.
Much the same dynamic takes place with political, literary, and
social associations on the Internet. Like the temperance societies of
Tocqueville's day, these Web sites allow like-minded individuals from
around the country to unite for common purposes. And like eBay and
Amazon, these Web sites use sophisticated reputation-management
systems to allow individuals to build trust in democratic and
egalitarian ways without the need for hierarchical authorities and
middlemen. For example, Slashdot.org allows members to discuss the
technology-related events of the day, from video games to First
48. Id.
49. Id.
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Amendment issues. Slashdot summons frequent users to serve as
moderators for a fixed period of time-not unlike jury duty-and
moderators have the power to rate contributions made by other users
on a scale of zero to five. If your user contributions are highly rated,
you accumulate something called "Karma" in the system, that gives
you special privileges: Your subsequent posts begin at a higher rating,
and you are more likely to be chosen as a moderator in the future.
Through the Karma system, you can maintain your status, but, as in
journalism and book publishing, you are only as good as the last thing
you write.
Sites like Slashdot, eBay, and Epinions allow people to be judged
based on how they behave, rather than who they are. In this sense,
they allow people who may disapprove vigorously of aspects of each
other's private lives and identities to interact as citizens on equal
terms. In real space, we are often told, it is impossible for citizens in a
multicultural democracy to transcend the limitations of their racial,
sexual, and cultural perspectives. In cyberspace, by contrast, only
your public identity, rather than your private identity, is at stake. The
eBay buyers and sellers who rate each other are interacting as buyers
and sellers without the need to tell each other everything about
themselves. And this resurrection of boundaries makes it easier for
citizens to interact productively and to form trusting relationships in a
pluralistic age. A gun-toting "good old boy" in Montana may
disapprove of the lifestyle of a cosmopolitan opera lover in New York,
but, shielded by the two-dimensionality of the Internet, which strips
away the markers of their identity, both can interact on equal terms as
participants in the marketplace of goods or ideas.
Indeed, a growing body of empirical research suggests that people
will act selfishly when they think their fellow citizens are acting
selfishly, but are more likely to cooperate when they believe that
everyone else is cooperating. This plays out in all sorts of ways.
Colleges can decrease undergraduate drinking, for example, merely
by announcing that drinking trends are going down. People are more
likely to comply with tax laws, drunk driving laws, and anti-fraud laws
when they perceive that others are behaving honestly or driving
soberly. Increased penalties for tax fraud and drunk driving, in other
words, may be effective not because they make people fear
punishment, but because they create the impression that others are
behaving better in ways that promote reciprocal cooperation.
The Internet is a space where this sort of reciprocal cooperation
among strangers is especially possible because it abstracts away
divisive group identities and commitments. On the Internet, people
do not think of each other as members of particular races, genders, or
religions, but as fellow eBay traders or Slashdot debaters. Rather
than forcing members to interact as members of polarized groups, the
Internet allows strangers to rate and rank each other as individuals.
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Instead of denying the individualistic tendencies of democracy,
therefore, it harnesses these tendencies in cooperative ways. By
creating economic and political incentives for individuals to behave
well, the Internet gives us a model of democratic shame.
Of course, the two-dimensionality of the Internet is only a quirk of
its current architecture, and over the next few decades it is likely to be
replaced by a three-dimensional, networked world, in which strangers
from around the globe are tied by interactive visual and auditory
links, rather than simply by the ties of cyberspace. In the next decade
or so, it is not unrealistic to imagine a world in which there are
cameras at home, in the workplace, on street corners, and perhaps
even floating in the air, and where biometric retinal identification
technology will track our every move on public streets. (Already,
rental car companies are installing monitors to record the speeds at
which renters drive and are adjusting their rates on a daily basis.)5"
Recently, we learned that the Florida police took video scans of all the
Super Bowl fans who entered the Tampa stadium .5 They then used
face recognition technology to match these pictures against the faces
of criminal suspects contained in databases. 5 2 Even if some people
resist these real-time technologies-which undermine the
asynchronicity that is one of the main benefits of Web
communications -the increasing integration of cyberspace and real
space will ensure that the citizens of the twenty-first century may be
subject to increasingly three-dimensional scrutiny by strangers around
the globe.
A society in which we are on camera much of the time and judged
by democratic feedback systems all the time will mean that private
citizens increasingly have to conduct themselves like public figures.
This will put increasing pressure on people to conduct themselves in
publicly and democratically acceptable ways.
This is a more extreme version of the dilemma that citizens faced in
the nineteenth century, as American citizens and cities grew
exponentially, and the question of how to present yourself to
anonymous strangers became a central feature of urban life. Shame
and embarrassment were a constant risk, as individuals lived in
constant uncertainty about whether or not their status claims would
be acknowledged or denied. To avoid exposing and shaming others,
and also to avoid participating in their shame, became a major
principle of public conduct. The elaborate codification of manners in
etiquette manuals was designed to prevent the uncertainty that could
lead to shaming encounters between different classes of people, who
50. Hal R. Varin, With Evolving Technology, Good Monitors Make for Better
Contracts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
51. See, e.g., Police System Analyzed Every Face at Super Bowl, N.Y. Times, Feb.
1, 2001, at A16, LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
52. See, e.g., id.
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were insecure about their status, on streetcars and trains, and in
elevators and hotels. Ladies and gentlemen avoided calling attention
to themselves as individuals by wearing modest black clothing and
keeping aloof from any personal engagement. The elaborate rituals of
hat tipping, for example, were designed to preserve privacy and
anonymity in public. By avoiding eye contact, and honoring a passing
woman as a lady rather than as an individual, a gentleman could
preserve her privacy as well as his own. And the rigidly proscribed
rituals of deference prevented individuals from shaming or being
shamed when they were uncertain about the status of strangers they
encountered.
Nineteenth-century rituals of shame avoidance were closely linked
to emotional control. By rigidly controlling all aspects of the body,
etiquette manuals urged, individuals could command themselves.
"The highest cultivation in social manners enables a person to conceal
from the world his real feelings," wrote Ward McAllister, the arbiter
of New York's nineteenth-century elite.53 Ever since the 1960s, by
contrast, citizens have faced powerful democratic pressures to confess
as many details of their private lives as possible, in order to express
their authentic selves and prove that they are no better than anyone
else. In the last presidential election, Al Gore and George Bush had
to act like Oprah, presenting themselves as victims by revealing their
most embarrassing secrets-Bush's former drinking problem and
Gore's fraught relationship with his father-to establish a democratic
connection with voters. But a confessional culture in which
individuals demand simultaneously the right to let it all hang out and
the right to be treated precisely the same as everyone else is a culture
in which people disagree vigorously about what sort of behavior
should be considered shameful.
By masking the aspects of identity about which people disagree, the
Internet reminds us that strangers can interact most productively
when they maintain some boundaries between their public and private
selves. In this sense, the most successful individuals in the twenty-first
century may be those who can master the art of democratic manners
and avoid forms of democratic shame in all spheres of their lives.
What kind of democratic manners are necessary for success in a
world where our status depends on the judgment and scrutiny of
strangers? It is important, above all, not to act in an elitist fashion-
not to make it appear that you think you are better than anyone else.
(This is why Bill Gates and Warren Buffet wear open neck shirts and
recently ate together at McDonalds.) You should treat everyone with
whom you interact with equal concern and respect, because each
encounter has the power to affect your reputation in potentially
53. Ward McAllister, A Glimpse of High Society, in The Nation Transformed: The
Creation of an Industrial Society 308,311 (Sigmund Diamond ed., 1963).
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indelible ways. The one thing that can ruin a personal or professional
career is hate speech or sexual harassment-evidence of the
undemocratic sin of treating other individuals or groups with
contempt. It is important to affirm the contribution and worth of
everyone with whom you interact-from students and readers to
business associates and C-SPAN callers-and to convey the
impression that each of them is equally deserving of concern and
respect, even though some comments may be more equal than others.
And it is important to expose enough of yourself so that you can
establish a democratic connection, but not so much that you reveal
divisive aspects of your private thoughts and behavior of which some
people may disapprove.
In a world where technology, the media, cyberspace, and law are
tearing down the boundary between the public and private sphere,
those who display democratic manners-exercising individual self-
restraint with an eye toward winning the good opinion of others-may
be the most successful. Increasingly, we are all public figures in one
way or another, and, as public figures, we have to behave like
politicians in our public and private lives, acting in a way that
establishes democratic connections and avoiding bad behavior that
could come back to haunt us.
In short, as society becomes more egalitarian and more transparent,
treating everyone with respect in face-to-face interactions becomes
ever more important. And the most successful personalities may be
those who move seamlessly between different social spheres,
presenting in each a similarly respectful face to the world. In this
sense, we may be returning to the democratic manners that were
prized during Tocqueville's time, when the malleability of status
resulted in a social premium on transparency and sincerity, and a
horror of hypocrisy and confidence in men who appeared to be
something they were not. (Later in the nineteenth century, as a more
hierarchical corporate structure replaced the small industrial
entrepreneur of the 1830s, manners became more ritualized, more
concerned with surface appearance, and less concerned with
individual trustworthiness. 4) In the twentieth century, Lionel Trilling,
the great literary critic, distinguished between sincerity and
authenticity. Sincerity involves finding your true, socially embedded
self and remaining faithful to it for a lifetime. Authenticity involves
the acting out of many different selves and constantly reinventing
your identity in different situations. 6 If the decades since the 1960s
were an age of authenticity, perhaps we are returning to an age of
sincerity, in which the integrated, transparent, and well-mannered
personality is best suited for democratic success.
54. See Tocqueville, supra note 2, at 530-32.
55. See generally Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (2d ed. 1980).
56. Id.
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All this is not to say that the resurrection of shame and manners will
stop the inexorable development of the legalized self. Democracies,
as Tocqueville recognized, grow ever more democratic; similarly
legalized democracies grow ever more legalistic. Cyberspace will,
doubtlessly, be transformed over the next decades from a place where
shame and manners rule, to a place covered by a web of small,
uniform, painstaking rules and laws.- But this will give citizens of the
twenty-first century even more of an incentive to behave well in all
spheres of life: to avoid being shamed by technology on one hand, or
the fear of lawsuits on the other.
57. See Tocqueville, supra note 2, at 663.
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